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OIL AND GAS 
Upstream 
Tyger v. Precision Drilling Corp., ___ Fed. Appx. ___ (3d Cir. 2020), 
2020 WL 6268335. 
Blake v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, No. 3:19-0847, 2021 WL 
951705, slip op. (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 12, 2021). 
Property owners (“Owners”) sued a natural gas company (“Company”) 
for nuisance claims relating to noise, and to light, dust, debris, and odor 
from Company’s compressor station. Company motioned to dismiss and, 
alternatively, for summary judgment on both nuisance claims. Id. at 1. 
Company argues that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
because parties challenging the design and operation of compressor stations 
and other similar facilities must first bring their complaints to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), not a federal district court. Id. 
at 2-3. Company further argues that Owners’ nuisance claim is preempted 
by federal law because they relate to the interstate transportation of natural 
gas. Id. at 3. Conversely, Owners, argue that they are not challenging the 
operation of the facility and instead raise a nuisance claim falling outside of 
the Natural Gas Act. Id. The Court found that noise relates directly to the 
facility’s operation, implicating FERC’s subject matter jurisdiction over 
facility operation. Id. Therefore the Court granted Company’s 12(b)(1) 
motion relating to the noise nuisance. But the Court was hesitant to 
conclude that Owner’s light, debris, dust, and odor nuisance complaint 
invoked FERC’s regulatory regime, at least without further briefing. Id. The 
Court therefore dismissed without prejudice Company’s 12(b)(1) motion 
relating to the light, dust, debris, and odor nuisance. Id. The Court lastly 
rejected Company’s motion relating to Owners’ damages on procedural 
grounds. Id. 4-5.  
Wildgrass Oil and Gas Committee v. Colorado, No. 20-1151, 2021 WL 
318203, (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2021).  
In July 2018, a committee of residents (“Residents”) received lease 
offers from an Oil and Gas Corporation (“Corporation”) for access to 
minerals on their property. When Resident’s did not consent to lease offers, 
Corporation filed a pooling order application with Colorado Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission (“Commission”), requiring Residents to lease 
their mineral interests if Commission found the offers reasonable. The 
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Residents’ objected and the Commission set a hearing on the pooling 
application.  
Prior to the hearing, Residents filed a complaint in district court seeking 
a temporary restraining order and injunction. Residents argued forced 
pooling, authorized by state statute, violates the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, the First Amendment, the Contract Clause, and the Due Process 
Clause. The district court denied Residents’ request for injunctive relief and 
found the claim unripe. The district court asked Commission to hear 
Resident’s issues in a hearing. At the hearing, Commission found the 
leases’ reasonable and approved Corporation’s application to pool mineral 
interested owned by Residents for the purpose of extraction. Residents 
amended their complaint in district court, adding a procedural due process 
claim concerning the events at hearing. Commission filed a motion to 
dismiss based in part on the Burford abstention doctrine. The district court 
granted Commission’s motion to dismiss and Resident’s appealed. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district 
court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held the district 
court did not abuse its discretion because Residents’ procedural challenges 
raised questions of state law and a federal court resolving this matter risks 
causing tension with state policies. The appellate court affirmed.  
In re Sanchez Energy Corp., 19-34508, 2021 WL 923182 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. Mar. 9, 2021).  
Sanchez along with ten affiliates filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2019. 
Prior to filing, Sanchez, an upstream oil and gas producer, issued $500 
million of Senior Secured First Lien (“Senior Notes”). As collateral for 
these notes, Sanchez granted each of the Senior Noteholders a first-priority 
lien on all of its assets. Part of the collateral pledged by Sanchez were 
numerous oil and gas leases in Texas. The issue before the court is whether 
certain Senior Noteholders have valid liens on six challenged leases. If a 
challenged lease is not mentioned with reasonable certainty in the Deed of 
Trust it may be void according the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of 
Conveyances. Unsecured Creditors argue that the leases cannot be avoided 
in bankruptcy because the leases are not referenced in the Deeds of Trust 
with reasonable certainty. Under chapter 11, “unsecured creditors are 
entitled to share in the proceeds of any avoided leans.” Senior Noteholders 
argue that the liens are valid because the “Deeds of Trust contained mere 
clerical errors, which do not create uncertainty regarding which leases are 
subject to liens.” Any writing transferring and oil and gas lease must 
include “specific information revealing the locations of the leases.” In 
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limited circumstances, a court may use extrinsic evidence to determine if 
the lease is referenced with reasonable certainty. Here, the court finds that 
three of the challenged leases are not referenced with reasonably certainty 
and therefore, the liens on those leases may be voided but the balance may 
not be. The court reasoned that two inconsistencies in the Deed of Trust 
make them uncertain. First, the Release and Savings clauses contradicted 
and created confusion. Second, the counties listed on the deed are not the 
same as listed on “Exhibit A lease schedules.” 
Hoffman v. Thomson, --- S.W.3d ---- (2021), 2021 WL 881286.  
This opinion has not been released for publication and is subject to 
revision or withdrawal. Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
Grantor conveyed a 1,070-acre tract of land to Grantee, reserving “an 
undivided three thirty-second’s (3/32’s) interest (same being three-fourths 
(3/4’s) of the usual one-eighth (1/8th) royalty” in all of the oil and gas 
production from the conveyed land. The parties disputed whether the Deed 
reserved a floating or a fixed royalty interest, Grantor sought a declaratory 
judgment to construe the Deed. A fixed royalty interest would be a fixed 
fraction of total production, a floating royalty interest would vary 
depending on the negotiated royalty percentage. The trial court found the 
Deed conveyed a fixed Interest, Grantor appealed, and this court reversed. 
When construing the Deed, the court focused on (1) the intent of the parties 
expressed by the “four corners” of the Deed; and (2) harmonizing all parts 
of the Deed, even if the parts appear inconsistent. The court looked at the 
year the deed was executed, the plain language of the entire deed, and the 
structure of the deed and found: (1) in 1956 using a one-eighth royalty rate 
was so pervasive, it was seen as the standard and customary royalty, 
therefore the Deed should be construed accordingly; (2) applying a floating 
construct gave meaning to all the language of the Deed; and (3) using a 
floating construct did not create any conflicts and harmonized the entire 
Deed. In contrast, a fixed construct would render provisions inconsistent if 
a different royalty rate was ever to be negotiated. Therefore, the court found 
the Deed reserved a floating royalty interest for Grantor. 
Midstream 
In re First River Energy, LLC, 986 F.3d 914 (5
th
 Cir. 2021) 
Debtor, First River Energy, LLC (“FRE”), filed for Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy relief in January 2018 through the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for 
the Western District of Texas. FRE had purchased oil from Oklahoma and 
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Texas Producers to sell downstream but failed to compensate the Producers. 
Thus, the Producers asserted a priority lien in the Bankruptcy proceedings 
against FRE for the oil sale proceeds. Simultaneously, Deutsche Bank Trust 
Company Americas, and associates (“Bank”) also asserted a priority lien 
against the sale proceeds, as a secured creditor of FRE and its operations. 
Although the Producers were found to have not waived any rights to assert 
liens, statutory schemes under Texas, Oklahoma, and most importantly, 
Delaware law; which governed since FRE was organized in the state of 
Delaware, confirmed that the Bank’s interests perfected and attached to the 
bank before any interest attached to most of the Producers. This provided 
the Bank with a priority lien over the security interests of the Texas 
Producers and most of the Oklahoma Producers. Additionally, the loan 
documents between the Bank and FRE did not cause the Bank’s interests to 
be overshadowed by the unperfected interests of the Texas Producers and 
most of the Oklahoma Producers. However, due to the statutory scheme of 
the Oklahoma Lien Act, the Bank did not have complete priority over some 
of the Oklahoma Producers. Therefore, certain Oklahoma Producers of the 
oil had priority to place a lien on their share of the oil proceeds which FRE 
had obtained. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling granting in part and 
denying in part, the bank’s Motion for Summary Judgement, was affirmed 
and thus, the affirmative defenses made by Producers were dismissed. 
Attorney’s fee determinations were remanded back to the Bankruptcy Court 
for further determination, subject to the Oklahoma Producers successful 
proof of the Oklahoma Liens. 
WATER 
Federal 
Severa v. Solvay Specialty Polymers USA, LLC, 1:20-cv-06906-NLH-
KMW, 2021 WL 912850 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2021) 
Plaintiffs brought a class action against Defendants Solvay Specialty 
Polymers USA, LLC and its predecessor (collectively “Solvay”) for 
Solvay’ improper disposal, which caused contamination of the municipal 
water supply in National Park, New Jersey. Solvay moved to dismiss based 
on lack of standing and pleading deficiency governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(2). 
Solvay argued that Plaintiffs failed to show proximate cause. The court 
disagreed and found that on the face of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, it is 
not too remote that Solvay’ actions of discharging chemicals resulted in the 
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claimed injuries. Regarding pleading sufficiency, the court addressed each 
count separately: 
(1) Count I – Public Nuisance: Solvay argued that they did not control 
the public nuisance, but Plaintiffs alleged that the chemicals discharged into 
the environment, rather than the municipal water supply, constitutes the 
public nuisance, which was controlled by Solvay. Plaintiffs failed to plead 
the special injury, but a plaintiff must prove a special injury to be awarded 
money damages on a public nuisance claim, in this case Plaintiffs’ 
requested relief was to enjoin or abate the public nuisance instead. 
(2) Count II – Private Nuisance: the court distinguished Ross v. Lowitz, 
120 A.3d 178 (N.J. 2015), and found that Plaintiffs have asserted a viable 
cause of action the Solvay’s unlawful conducts were the proximate cause of 
an invasion of Plaintiffs’ interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, 
in addition to a public nuisance. 
(3) Plaintiffs also have alleged sufficient facts to support their Count II – 
Trespass, Count IV – Negligence, Count V – New Jersey Spill 
Compensation and Control Act, and Plaintiffs’ request for medical 
monitoring. 
The court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Count IV – Punitive Damages, but 
Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages may still proceed. Therefore, the 
court granted Solvay’ motions on one issue, but denied in all other respects. 
Canton Drop Forge, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., NO. 5:18-cv-01253, 
2021 WL 930457 (N.D. Ohio. Mar. 11, 2021) 
Plaintiff Canton Drop Forge, Inc. (“CDF”) sued its insurer, Travelers 
Casualty & Surety Company (“Travelers”) for a declaratory judgment that 
Travelers was obligated to indemnify CDF under one or more insurance 
policies for at least $5,000,000.  
Plaintiff CDF operated an engineered wastewater recycling and disposal 
system, including retention basins known as Ponds. On January 22, 2013, 
after several inspections, the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (“USEPA”) issued a Notice of Violation to CDF related to the 
accumulation of oil within the Ponds (the “CDF Pond Closure Claim”). 
USEPA and CDF settled by entering a Consent Agreement and Final Order 
on September 18, 2014. CDF first notified Travelers of this claim on 
November 30, 2016. 
Traveler moved for summary judgment, and the court granted the 
summary judgment as a matter of law. It was disputed that the claimed five 
umbrella policies exists, as neither party has located a complete copy and 
any of the policies, but Travelers was not seeking summary judgment as to 
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the existence of the policies, and the court granted the summary judgment 
assuming arguendo the existence of one or more policies of insurance.  
The court found CDF failed to provide reasonable notice of its Pond 
Closure Claim to Travellers as the policy language required that notice be 
provided “as soon as practicable” and/or “immediately. CDF also breached 
the policy terms by settling the Pond Closure Claim without the consent of 
Travelers. Travelers was presumed that it was prejudiced by CDF’s breach, 
and the court found Travelers suffered actual prejudice because CDF left 
Travelers with no opportunity to be involved in defending or negotiating a 
resolution to the Pond Closure Claim.  
This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the 
higher court as of publication. 
Ozark Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. SRG Global, LLC, 2021 WL 963491 
(E.D. Mo. March 15, 2021). 
Company 1 is a Missouri corporation owned by Missouri residents, 
Company 2 is a leading manufacturer of chrome plated plastic for 
automobiles parts. Sometime in 2017, plaintiff alleges moving Company 
2’s Plant Manager informed them that defendant had and was continuing to 
pollute their groundwater and soil with hexavalent chromium and was 
investigating the contamination. Testing confirmed this, but Company 1 
claimed it was not actually informed of real or potential contamination until 
March 2019, by which time the pollutants had been found in the owner’s 
blood. This led to multiple claims, including one for Negligent 
Misrepresentation against the Plant Manager. Plant Manager filed a motion 
to dismiss in December 2020, alleging Company 1 fraudulently joined him 
to avoid removal to federal court. Removal to federal court requires that no 
plaintiff be citizens of the same state as a defendant. “Joinder of a defendant 
is fraudulent where there exists no reasonable basis in law or fact to support 
the claim asserted against it.” The real question is whether the plaintiff has 
a colorable claim against the non-diverse defendant. Plant Manager bears 
the burden of proving fraud. The court found the elements of negligent 
misrepresentation not supported by the alleged facts. Plant Manager did 
inform them there was the potential that Company 1’s land was 
contaminated in 2017 and confirmed it in 2019, which were not false 
statements. Also, the statements were not made for the guidance of a 
limited group of persons in a business transaction, as the court found the 
drilling on Company 1’s land not a business transaction but part of 
Company 2’s investigation of the contamination. Motion to dismiss was 
granted.  
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Citizens Dev. Corp., Inc. v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 12CV00334 GPC-
KSC, 2021 WL 510041 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2021). 
In September 2011, San Diego Region of the California Regional Water 
Quality Control Board (“RWQCB”) issued an Investigative Order alleging 
Corporation had released pollutants into lake. Corporation then filed suit 
against several California municipal corporations (“Municipalities”) 
alleging Municipalities’ discharge contaminated the lake from inadequate 
waste disposal and landscaping techniques, sanitary sewer overflows, septic 
system failures, groundwater infiltration, etc. Corporation asserted several 
causes of actions against Municipalities relating to their contamination of 
the lake, one being private recovery under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). 
One Municipality counterclaimed against Corporation for its contamination 
of the lake.  
Corporation and one Municipality (“Settlers”) reached a settlement in 
December 2020 and filed a Motion for Good Faith Settlement 
Determination and Request for Judicial Notice. Remaining Municipalities 
(“Remaining”) filed a conditional opposition, stating Remaining will 
oppose the Motion if the Court does not take the settlement into account 
when determining Remaining’s potential liability. The United States 
District Court for the Southern District of California found judicial notice 
of discovery materials, orders, party filings, and expert reports improper. 
However, the court took judicial notice of RWQCB’s approval of the 
Remedial Report. Movants argue one of Settler’s expert report cannot be 
considered in the court’s determination of whether the settlement was made 
in good faith. The court disagreed and presumed the report’s admissibility 
for purposes of determining the settlement agreement’s good faith. 
Based upon the evidence before the court, the court also found the 
Settlement Agreement was made in good faith as it is “fair, reasonable, and 
adequate, and is consistent with the purposes of CERCLA.” The court 
discharged Remaining’s liability for any act, omission, or misconduct on 
the part of Settlers in the lake’s contamination. Court dismissed all claims 
against the settling party with prejudice.  
Telford Borough Auth. v. EPA, No. 12-CV-6548, 2021 WL 392637 (E.D. 
Pa. Feb. 4, 2021). 
Municipality sued EPA seeking judicial review of EPA’s establishment 
of a total maximum daily load regulating the number of pollutants found in 
the Indian Creek Watershed. In August 2019, Municipality filed a motion 
for leave to amend its Complaint, seeking to include additional averments 
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and 14 additional claims against EPA. EPA opposed the addition of 17 of 
the additional averments, and eight of the new claims. In February 2020, 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
granted Municipality’s motion to include additional averments and all but 
two of the additional 14 claims. EPA filed a motion to reconsider the 
district court’s ruling. In June 2020, Municipality filed a motion to leave to 
supplement its response. The court granted Municipalities motion. EPA 
argued Municipality’s additional claims violate the Federal Rules of 
Evidence as they “inappropriately disclosed details of the parties’ 
settlement negotiations.” Municipality argued only one claim references a 
settlement agreement and only because EPA had referenced said settlement 
discussions in a previous denial to Municipality’s alternative watershed 
restoration plan. The district court disagreed and struck paragraphs and 
counts from the complaint which referenced settlement negotiations, in any 
form, including reference to the lack of meetings between Municipality and 
EPA to negotiate settling Municipality’s claims. 
State 
Eureka Cty. v. Sadler Ranch, LLC, 480 P.3d 837 (Nev. 2021). 
Eureka County appealed a district court order granting a petition for 
judicial review of an issuance of a permit for mitigation water rights by the 
State Engineers. Sadler Ranch applied for two permits: one to alter the 
point of diversion for their surface water rights in Big Shipley Springs (“the 
Spring”) and another to allow Sadler Ranch to draw Basin groundwater to 
alleviate the lack of surface water available.  
State Engineers granted both permits, but the groundwater permit was 
subservient to the diversion permit. Sadler Ranch sought clarification on the 
specific quantity allowed, in total, under both permits. However, before the 
clarification was made, State Engineer made a final determination that 
clarified Sadler Ranch’s rights. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada 
held that the various calculations of the rights that are at issue in this appeal 
are moot. Additionally, Eureka Springs failed to properly raise the issue of 
Sadler Ranch’s quantification of rights in their opening brief. Because of 
their failure to raise the issue, the claim was waived and is now a matter for 
the district court.  
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Aji P. by and through Piper v. State, 480 P.3d 438 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2021). 
Multiple minors (“Youths”) sued the State and Governor of Washington, 
and other various state agencies and their directors (“Washington”), seeking 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Youths alleged that Washington 
caused and continues to cause injury by furthering a fossil-fuel based 
energy system. Amongst other claims, Youths argued that Washington 
knew the fossil fuel energy system results in greenhouse gas emissions, 
causing environmental damage. Trial court granted Washington’s motion 
for judgment on the pleadings and Youths appealed.  
First, Youths sought remedy in the form of a declaration that a healthy 
climate system is a fundamental right and that the court develop and 
enforce a climate recovery plan. The Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 1, held that the Youth’s requested remedy would violate the 
separation of powers doctrine because those tasks are reserved to the 
legislative and executive branches under the Washington State Constitution.  
Second, Youths asserted that their claims were justiciable under the 
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. The court rejected this argument 
because, even if the court could resolve the claims, the resolution would not 
be final since adopting a climate plan would require continual enforcement.  
Third, Youth brought substantive due process and equal protection 
claims; however, the court was unwilling to create a fundamental right in a 
safe and healthy environment due to a lack of social or legal history 
recognizing such a fundamental right. And because Youths failed to show 
that such fundamental rights existed, no substantive due process or equal 
protection rights were violated.  
Next, Youths’ state-created danger claim was rejected by the court 
because Youths failed to show how Washington’s actions placed them in a 
worse position. Lastly, Youths’ public trust doctrine claim failed because 
Washington has not expanded the doctrine to specifically include the 
atmosphere and the court was unwilling to do so.  
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. N. Carolina Dep't of Env't Quality, 
990 F.3d 818 (4th Cir. 2021). 
Pipeline Company sought to extend a natural gas pipeline from a 
mainline project under construction through North Carolina. Under the 
Natural Gas Act, the pipeline required a certificate from the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and state authority that regulated the 
pipeline under the Clean Water Act. FERC issued a certificate of public 
convenience because the mainline project had all the required federal 
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permits, which was disputed in multiple lawsuits. Pipeline Company 
applied for certification through the North Carolina Department of 
Environmental Quality (Department) to satisfy state requirements. 
Department’s hearing officer recommended that it will not pass until the 
federal requirements are met or to deny state certification. Department then 
denied certification.  
The Fourth Circuit of Appeals reviewed the conclusion of the 
certification, holding it must be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Pipeline Company made 
multiple arguments. First, it argued that the proposed activity lacked 
practical alternatives and had a less adverse impact on surface waters or 
wetlands than the hearing officer admitted of the Department. The court 
held the uncertainty of the Mainline Project could result in impacts to water 
if not completed.  
Second, Pipeline Company contends that the Clean Water Act prescribes 
certain authority, and the Department exceeded that authority. Under the 
Clean Water Act, the rules must be to maintain beneficial uses of water, and 
North Carolina’s rules fall under that because it is protecting the riparian 
buffers.  
Lastly, Pipeline Company argued that the decision was arbitrary and 
capricious because the officer did not explain the decision. The court held 
that the disagreement between the hearing officers and the department 
should be remanded due to the contradiction. The court also remanded to 
obligate the Department to explain its denial instead of a conditional 
approval. 
Town of Concord v. Water Dep’t of Littleton, 487 Mass. 56 (2021). 
An 1884 Act permitted Concord to take and hold the waters of the 
Nagog Pond. The Act permitted surrounding towns of Littleton and Acton 
also to use the water. In 1909, Concord specifically exercised the right to 
take the water from the Nagog Pond. Later in 1985, the legislature passed 
the Water Management Act (WMA) to improve the legal framework for 
water and demand. The WMA implemented a regulatory program and 
registration for water usage and permits, and Concord registered the water 
takings from the Nagog Pond in 1991. In 2017, Littleton reported a need for 
water and notified Concord of the intent to take water from Nagog Pond 
under the Act. Concord sought a declaratory judgment in that the WMA 
superseded the Act, and Concord, therefore, had the superior claim to water 
usage. Both parties filed for summary judgment, and the district court 
granted Concord’s motion.  
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the decision of 
law de novo on whether the WMA repealed the Act. The WMA did not 
expressly repeal the Act; therefore, the standard was whether the statutes 
are so repugnant and inconsistent that both cannot stand. The court held that 
the Act's taking provision was repugnant because it interfered with the 
WMA’s regulatory provision. The WMA restricted water usage, and 
allowing both Littleton and Acton to take water based on town need would 
override procedures placed by WMA. Acton and Littleton argued that 
taking for water supply purposes was permitted. The court agreed that 
allowing the taking of Nagog Pond would put them in the WMA process 
and not interfere with its purpose. Therefore, Littleton and Acton may apply 
through WMA and use water from Nagog but not gain priority over 
Concord.  
In re Reissuance of an NPDES/SDS Permit to United States Steel Corp., 
954 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2021).  
Steel Producer was granted a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System/State Disposal System (NPDES/SDS) permit from the Minnesota 
Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) in 1987. Steel Producer’s production 
allowed wastewater with sulfate to discharge into groundwater. MPCA 
starting in 1987, expressed concern over the sulfate, and in 2000 sent a 
warning letter to Steel Producer. The sulfate levels of Steel Producer rose 
until MPCA issued in 2018, permit to limits sulfate levels by 2025. MPCA 
set out a 250 mg/L sulfate standard promulgated by Class 1 secondary 
drinking water standards. Steel Producer challenged the limits because the 
regulations were not groundwater nor clarify groundwater. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Steel Producer. 
MPCA provides NPDES/SDS through the Clean Water Act and required 
permit to discharge pollutants into state water. MPCA also designated water 
into different classes in part by water purity and quality through seven 
classes of water. The first class was used for drinking or other domestic 
purposes, and quality control is necessary for public health.  
The Supreme Court of Minnesota ruled on whether Minnesota Rules 
classify groundwater as Class 1 water. The court determined that many 
rules provide that groundwater is Class 1 water. However, the court also 
acknowledged discrepancies between potable water and Class 1, and issues 
on whether that water is safe for consumption. Thus, the court employed 
other tools of construction to hold that groundwater was indeed Class 1 
water. The court gave considerable deference to MPCA’s own 
interpretation throughout the years and its history of that determination. 
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Other rules gave a numeric and narrative standard, including secondary 
drinking water and incorporating the intent to incorporate groundwater into 
that. The court remanded for further proceedings. 
DeBuff v. Montana Dep’t of Nat. Res. and Conservation, 2021 MT 68, 
DA-200071, 2021 WL 972408. 
Landowner proposed to divert groundwater by four wells and a pit. 
Landowner applied for water use through the Montana Department of 
Natural Reservation and Conservation (DNRC), who denied the application 
in a 1987 Final Order without prejudice. Landowner then assessed the 
aquifer test in 2014 and found that there was little impact. After back and 
forth on the validity of the test, in February of 2016, Landowner reapplied 
for a water use permit. The parties proceeded to issue more tests and 
reports. In March of 2018, Landowner amended his application and 
downsized his proposal. And in August, a preliminary determination issued 
by the Water Resources Regional Officer denied the amended application. 
Landowner objected, requested a show cause hearing, and presented 
evidence.  
In January of 2019, Hearing Examiner issued a Final Order which denied 
the Landowner’s application. Landowner then petitioned a review from the 
Water Court, who then entered judgment in favor of Landowner and DNRC 
appealed.  
The Montana Supreme Court used the following test to determine 
whether the agency finding was clearly erroneous: (1) The record was 
reviewed to determine whether findings are supported by substantial 
evidence; (2) whether the agency misapprehended the effect of evidence; 
and (3) if so, a court may still hold findings as clearly erroneous if the 
record showed a definite and firm conviction of mistake. First, the court 
held that DNRC use of the 1987 order, was not improper due to its use as 
evidence in Landowner’s show cause hearing, and the Landowner was put 
on notice for its inclusion. The court then held that DNRC continuously 
moved the requirements and did not explain its decision regarding the 
evapotranspiration test. The court held that DNRC rejected without proper 
basis and should move forward in the process. 
  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021





Glacier Park Iron Ore Properties, LLC v. United States Steel Corp., No. 
A20-0687, 2021 WL 416695 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2021).  
Mineral Owner sued Surface Owner over Surface Owner’s accumulation 
of waste rock on property from mining operation conducted on neighboring 
property. Mineral Owner sued under theories of nuisance and trespass. 
Mineral owner sought relief through declaratory judgment and injunction to 
prevent further accumulation. Surface Owner moved for dismissal under 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which 
relief could be granted. The lower court granted Surface Owner’s motion, 
and dismissed Mineral Owner’s trespass claim. Further, the lower court 
dismissed Mineral Owner’s claims of nuisance and resulting declaratory 
judgment. Mineral Owner appealed, asserting the lower court erred in 
dismissing its complaint with specificity towards nuisance and declaratory 
judgement. On appeal, the court reviewed Mineral Owner’s complaints de 
novo.  
On review, the court reversed dismissal of Mineral Owner’s nuisance 
claim, holding that Mineral Owner pled sufficient factual allegations to 
prove injury, thus surviving of a motion of dismissal. The court contended 
that Mineral Owner proved injury by correlating Surface Owner’s 
accumulation of waste rock to a decreased value in Mineral Owner’s rights 
within his estate. The court remanded Mineral Owner’s nuisance claim 
back to the lower court for further determination. Conversely, the court 
affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Mineral Owner’s request for 
declaratory judgment, holding that Mineral Owner’s claim was insufficient 
in entitling it to relief.  
This case is largely procedural. Additionally, this is an unpublished 
opinion of the court; therefore, state (or federal) court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
Western Watersheds Project v. Bernhardt, No. 1:16-cv-00083-BLW, 
2021 WL 517035 (D. Idaho. Feb. 11, 2021).  
Four Environmental Groups (“Groups”) brought action against The 
Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) and Forest Service challenging the 
cancellation of BLM’s withdrawal application of a considerable portion of 
federal lands for mining entry. Groups argued that BLM failed to properly 
analyze the impact of easing restrictions on their respective regions, thus 
allegedly devaluating harm to a bird species in rapid population decline. 
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Groups also alleged BLM’s cancellation violated the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”). Before litigation, BLM proposed plans to tighten restrictions and 
surface usage within bird species’ habitat. Following the proposal, BLM, 
with support from FWS, applied to withdrawal a considerable portion of 
land for mineral entry. The Secretary of Interior approved the withdrawal 
application. BLM subsequently canceled the withdrawal application, citing 
environmental statements and lack of need for the conservation effort. Both 
parties sought summary judgment.  
Groups argued BLM’s cancellation risks (1) to the enjoyment and use of 
members and (2) risk for observation and photography of the bird species. 
Defendants argue Groups lack jurisdiction to challenge BLM’s actions due 
to (1) lack of final agency action, (2) lack of standing, and (3) Groups’ 
standalone Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) claims are incapable of 
judicial recognition.  
In deciding agency action, the court held that BLM’s decision constitutes 
final agency action, therefore subject to judicial review. Next, the court 
determined that Groups have standing. The court found for Groups’ 
standing by assessing the risk of harm to the bird species habitat, and 
pertinence to the mission of each respective organization. Finally, the court 
determined that Groups’ APA claims were cognizable. Taken together, the 
court ultimately determined that Groups’ challenge warrants judicial 
review. 
Addressing Groups’ challenge to BLM cancellation of withdrawal, the 
court determined that BLM failed to consider several impacts of allowing 
mineral entry. The court deemed the BLM’s decision as arbitrary and 
capricious, thus vacating the decision and remanding it to BLM for further 
consideration. Additionally, the court granted Groups’ motion for summary 
judgment on their APA violation claims. The court ultimately denied 
Groups’ NEPA violation claim and denied Defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment. 
Builders League of S. Jersey v. Borough of Haddonfield, No. A-5588-18, 
2021 WL 806933 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 3, 2021). 
The case involves Association challenging Borough’s adoption of an 
ordinance governing stormwater management in the municipality. Borough 
appeals from the lower court’s decision finding the ordinance invalid. 
Association claimed the ordinance was invalid because it subjected new 
home construction to a review process that contradicts State statute and 
regulations. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirms 
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the lower court’s orders for the following reasons. The New Jersey 
Legislature delegated its authority to regulate land use to municipalities 
under the Municipal Land Use Law (“MLUL”). Municipalities are required 
to strictly follow the MLUL. The MLUL authorized the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) to adopt regulations 
governing municipal stormwater management plans. Each municipality 
must therefore conform to the DEP’s regulations. The DEP’s stormwater 
regulations applied to “major developments,” whereas Borough’s ordinance 
broadly applied to “all new homes and commercial buildings.” The MLUL 
also provides that detached one or two dwelling-unit buildings shall be 
exempt from certain reviews, but under the ordinance these dwellings are 
subject to all the relevant reviews. The state supreme court has also 
recognized that one of the major purposes of the MLUL was to create 
statewide uniformity. The court ultimately held the ordinance to be in 
conflict with the MLUL and therefore, invalid. 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
Spire STL Pipeline LLC v. 3.31 Acres of Land, No. 4:18 CV 1327, 2021 
WL 842601, slip op. (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2021). 
This case involves various motions to dismiss expert testimony by both 
parties—a natural gas pipeline constructor (“Constructor”) and landowners 
(“Owners”). The expert witnesses are to appear before a Commission 
deciding the value of Owners’ easements that the Constructor acquired 
through eminent domain to construct its pipeline. Id. at 1. Most of the 
expert witnesses can testify using Federal Rules of Evidence 702. Spire at 
5-7 and 10. In allowing the testimony, the Court also stated that questions 
about the expert’s methodology or lack of knowledge go to the weight of 
the evidence, not its admissibility. Spire at 5-7, 10, and 17. Constructor 
argued that expert testimony regarding soil damage was unnecessary 
because it had a continuing obligation under the Federal Regulatory Energy 
Commission to resolve soil damage. Id. at 5. But the Court found Owners’ 
expert testimony admissible and of factual import because it was unclear 
what obligations Constructor had toward Owners, especially because 
Constructor categorized the obligation as merely to “investigate and as 
necessary address” any landowner concern. Id. at 5. Additionally, non-
speculative expert testimony concerning the quality of the land parcel is 
admissible. Id. at 6-7. Relatedly, a Ph.D.’s testimony regarding the quality 
of the topsoil and potential remedial measures (including the possible use of 
earthworms) is admissible even with the expert’s wording of “time will 
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tell” or it being an “educated guess.” Id. at 11-12. Constructor’s expert 
witness can rebut this testimony, however. Id. at 16-17. Some testimony 
regarding future crop loss allegedly caused by the pipeline construction was 
excluded as too speculative under Missouri law, but testimony concerning 
past crop loss is admissible. Id. at 8 and 13.  
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, v. 8.60 Acres of Land, No. 7:19-cv-223, 
2021 WL 833959, slip op. (W.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2021). 
This case involves the enforceability of a contract between a natural gas 
pipeline (“Pipeline”) and a Landowner. Specifically, it involved the 
meaning of a contractual provision requiring Landowner to “comply with 
811” if it was necessary for Landowner to repair a waterline crossing the 
pipeline. Id. at 1 and 3. 811 is a national calling system to be used before 
digging to ensure there are no pipes or lines in the excavation area. Id. at 1. 
A magistrate reported there was no meeting of the minds about what this 
provision meant and the district court, reviewing de novo, agreed. Id. One 
issue is what law the parties intended the provision to invoke: the federal 
law that required calling 811 before digging via mechanical and hand-tool 
means or Virginia’s law that exempted hand-tool digging from the 811 call 
in requirements. Id. at 1-2. The Court found that the parties, through several 
negotiations, continued to attach different meanings to what Landowner’s 
compliance with 811 would mean. Id. at 3. Additionally, Landowner 
rejected a proposal that required it to call 811 and to notify Pipeline before 
digging, which further evidenced a lack of a meeting of the minds. Id. 
Therefore, the Court found there was no agreement on what the provision 
meant, and no enforceable contract.  
Selbert v. Shelton Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 2020 WL 8765933 
(Conn. December 23, 2020). 
Plaintiffs appealed a decision rendered by the Shelton Planning & 
Zoning Commission approving the defendant’s application for a site plan 
regarding redevelopment of property located in Shelton, Connecticut. The 
parcel of land contains gasoline pumps, a convenience store, and a storage 
shed in the back, for which the Defendant proposed demolishing the storage 
shed for the addition of a storage and cooler to the Commission. The 
defendant contends that the proposed plan does not violate regulations 
because “essentially moving the shed to the rear of the store structure does 
not result in an increase in any nonconformity.” The plaintiff’s main 
argument on appeal was that the Commission’s ruling that the defendant’s 
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site plan complied with zoning regulations was arbitrary, illegal, and an 
abuse of discretion. 
The applicable standard for a reviewing commission is General Statutes 
§ 8-3(g) which provides, “A site plan may be modified or denied only if it 
fails to comply with the requirements set forth in the zoning or inland 
wetlands regulations…” The court ultimately ruled that the defendant’s site 
plan violated applicable regulations. The City of Shelton has regulations 
prohibiting the enlargement or extension of legal nonconformities, further 
the court found “the proposed addition to the existing structure represents a 
material physical enlargement of the store.” The court further noted that 
since the site plan did not involve an increase in the business of the gas 
station, nor involved the intensification of a pre-existing nonconforming use 
of a gas station, the defendant’s assertion that the site plan followed 
regulations was pre-mature. Finally, the court found that defendant’s 
assertion that the use was an “extension” of the gas station was 
inapplicable. In part, that defendant “is seeking to physically enlarge the 
structure…not just use any existing unused space.” The Plaintiff’s appeal 
was sustained.  
MRC Permian Co. v. Point Energy Partners Permian LLC, No. 08-19-
00124-CV, 2021 WL 960927 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2021) 
Original Oil Lessee brought a claim against the Lessor, Current Lessee, 
Mineral Owners, and Financial Backer. Original Lessee sought a 
declaratory judgement on its invocation of the force majeure clause to 
extend drilling deadline. This force majeure clause in the lease provided 
Original Lessee could extend any drilling deadline given a non-economic 
event beyond its control delayed drilling operation. The clause did not 
require Original Lessee to provide notice until the deadline had passed; 
however creating issues as Lessors would not know whether their lease had 
terminated when the deadline was not met. Both parties filed competing 
motions for summary judgment when an incident like this occurred. Trial 
court certified three controlling question for interlocutory appeal. The first 
inquiry is the interpretation of the force majeure clause, which will 
ultimately decide whether the lease automatically terminated. This court 
held that the unavailability of the rig met the “off-lease” requirement 
triggering the clause because an “on-lease” condition was not included. The 
causation element of the force majeure clause does not require a triggering 
event have caused the missed deadline; a mere delay is sufficient. Summary 
judgement is precluded due to genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
options once the delay was encountered. The second certified question for 
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the court is the size of the production unit and the number of acres Lessee 
maintains if the lease was terminated. This court did not decide whether the 
lease was terminated, therefore this question is not ripe for this court and 
any opinion would be advisory. The last controlling question asks whether 
tortious interference was present in the contract. Issue of material fact exist 
in determining whether willful and intention interference was present in the 
lease and whether economic damage was sustained.  
Ross v. Flower, 2021 WL 904864. 
Not reported in SW Reporter. Only Westlaw citation is currently 
available. 
Grantor conveyed a 20-acre tract of land to Grantee’s predecessors in 
interest, Grantor brought suit against Grantee to declare ownership of the 
mineral estate. Both Grantor and Grantee agree the Deed is valid but 
disagree as to whether the Deed’s “subject to” clause reserved the mineral 
estate from the conveyance. The trial court found the “subject to” clause did 
not operate to reserve the mineral estate from the conveyance, Grantor 
appealed, and this court affirmed. Because neither party argued the Deed 
was ambiguous, the court proceeded with its analysis of an unambiguous 
deed. Usually, a grantor will convey all of the estate owned to the grantee 
unless there are specific reservations or exceptions that reduce the estate 
conveyed. A “subject to” clause in a deed usually functions to protect a 
grantor against a claim of breach of warranty by the grantee when there is 
already a mineral interest outstanding. In this case, the court found the 
“subject to” clause in the Deed did not reserve the mineral estate because: 
(1) the “subject to” clause also referenced “any and all validly existing 
encumbrances” indicating an intent by Grantor to avoid a breach of 
warranty claim rather than an intent to reserve the mineral estate; (2) 
Grantor had previously executed oil, gas, and mineral leases, indicating 
again, the “subject to” was meant to protect against a breach of warranty 
arising from an outstanding mineral interest rather than a reservation of the 
mineral estate; and (3) the “subject to” clause also referenced surface 
materials, and Grantor did not dispute conveying all the rights in the surface 
estate. In conclusion, from the “four corners” of the Deed, the court found 
the “subject to” clause to protect against a breach of warranty claim against 
Grantor rather than reserve the mineral estate. 
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Franklin v. Regions Bank, No. CV 5:16-1152, 2021 WL 867261 (W.D. 
La. Mar. 8, 2021). 
Three landowners filed a complaint against a bank that managed 
Landowners’ oil, gas, royalty, and mineral interests of 1805.34-acre land 
track, alleging a violation of their contract when Bank signed an improperly 
drafted lease extension. Two landowners had written agreements with the 
bank to manage and supervise their interest; however Third landowner had 
an oral agreement with the bank to manage her interests. Both Bank and 
Third landowner filed summary judgment motions and both were denied. 
Bank argued that Third landowner lacked an enforceable agreement 
because it was not in writing and no corroborating circumstances existed. 
The court found that no requirement existed for the agreement to be in 
writing because the agreement advised Landowner of her interests rather 
than created the authority for Bank to sign a lease extension. Corroborating 
circumstance, as required by the Louisiana Civil Code, was met through 
Landowner testimony, meeting the first requirement of having a witness, 
and the affidavits and videotaped depositions presented by Landowner, 
meeting the second requirement of additional corroborating evidence. 
Landowner argued a motion for summary judgment should be granted in 
her favor because a binding oral contact, with corroborating circumstances, 
existed. The court denied the motion because Bank presented evidence 
supporting its argument that no contract existed, and it did not advise the 
landowner regarding the lease extension; and therefore material issues of 
fact existed.  
ELECTRICITY 
Traditional 
Barsanti v. Montana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2021 MT 54N, 481 P.3d 232, 
2021 WL 790805 (Mont. March 2, 2021).  
Plaintiff’s appeal an earlier decision dismissing their claim regarding 
their 2018 petition of North Western Energy approval of a proposed 
electrical utility service rate increase by defendants. Since the plaintiff’s 
intervened into the 2018 case late, the only intervention right the plaintiffs 
were entitled was “street lighting issues, and related cost allocation and rate 
design.” Defendants issued a written order partially granting and dismissing 
certain intervenor testimonies, excluding specifically the plaintiff’s 
testimony of their counsel. The plaintiff’s petition further alleged that “PSC 
excluded portions of their pre-filed Testimony and Doty Testimony on 
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erroneous evidentiary grounds…and further precluded counsel (Doty) from 
serving both as Barsantis’ counsel and witness.” 
Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss asserting lack of 
jurisdiction by the court due to plaintiff’s failure to exhaust their 
administrative remedies. The district court granted the motion finding that 
plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Supreme 
Court of Montana further concluded that the plaintiffs did not exhaust all 
their administrative remedies, by example, filing a motion for 
reconsideration or a staying injunction incident to their petition for judicial 
review. The court recognized that there are two exceptions to exhausting 
remedies prior to seeking judicial review: “(1) exhaustion of an 
administrative remedy is unnecessary if the remedy would be futile as a 
matter of law and (2) exhaustion of administrative remedies is also 
unnecessary if the asserted administrative error depends on a pure question 
of law.” The court found that the plaintiff’s assertions of administrative 
error did not involve “pure questions of law.” The court further concluded 
that neither of the jurisprudential exceptions were applicable in the present 
case. The court affirmed the district court’s determination that the 
plaintiff’s failed to exhaust all their administrative remedies. 
Renewable 
Solarize Indiana, Inc. v. S. Indiana Gas and Elec. Co., 163 N.E.3d 880 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2021)  
 Per Indiana state law, the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission 
(“IURC”) possesses broad regulatory powers akin to that of a legislative 
body. Pursuant to a Congressional Act, known as PURPA, state regulatory 
agencies were required to adopt or reject certain regulatory provisions, such 
as to conserve energy, be more efficient, and promote equitable energy 
rates; of which the Indiana General Assembly partially adopted. Defendant, 
doing business as Vectren Energy (“Vectren”), filed with the IURC, two 
requests to alter operations. Under Indiana law, there exists a “thirty-day 
rule” by which objections to certain utility changes may be filed, and if 
objections meet certain requirements, a hearing must be held to resolve the 
matter before the initial filings are approved or denied. Plaintiff, Solarize 
Indiana (“Solarize”), filed objections to Vectren’s two filings on grounds 
that the changes violated PURPA. In response, the IURC denied both 
objections on the grounds that, as implemented in Indiana, the claimed 
provisions of PURPA were inapplicable, thus no hearing was held and 
Vectren’s changes were approved. This prompted Solarize to appeal to the 
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Indiana Court of Appeals. The Court affirmed IURC’s finding against 
Solarize. The Court further found that due to the IURC properly responding 
to Solarize’s objections before Solarize responded with new expanded 
arguments, IURC was in the clear to proceed with approving or denying 
Vectren’s proposed changes. The Court likened this to the process of filing 
a brief in court and how once a response to the initial brief has been filed, 
the matter is deemed resolved, and that new arguments of error may not 
then be put forward in a reply brief. Thus, ultimately finding (1) the IURC 
did not err in approving Vectren’s filings and (2) was well within its 
discretionary power to find that Solarize’s objections were not compliant 
with the “thirty-day rule”.  
TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, C.A. No. 11130-CB, 2021 WL 537325 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2021). 
Plaintiff, Dieckman, a member of a class of limited partners of a 
subsidiary corporation, Regency Energy Partners LP (“Regency”), brought 
suit through two counts of an Amended Complaint. The suit was brought 
against Regency’s general partner over how an acquisition by merger 
situation was handled. The counts centered upon breach of the Regency’s 
Limited Partnership Agreement by which a second subsidiary, Energy 
Transfer Partners (“ETP”); also owned by the same parent company which 
owned Regency, acquired Regency in a “unit-for-unit [m]erger.” The 
Limited Partnership Agreement is governed by Delaware Law; as Regency 
was organized in Delaware. First Dieckman asserted that Regency, through 
the general partner, breached the express provision of the partnership 
agreement, which dictated the merger had to be fair and reasonable. 
Second, Dieckman asserted that the Partnership had breached the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the class of limited partners. The 
court determined that although there were some discrepancies regarding 
some of the information provided by Dieckman, the discrepancies were not 
on the part of Regency or ETP, thus the information was not useful for 
proving the first count of the Amended Complaint. Further, Regency was 
able to prove that the merger was fair to the partnership and its 
shareholders. Dieckman was unable to prove that the general partner acted 
in bad faith or otherwise illegally through the merger. Last, Dieckman was 
unable to prove damages to the partnership stemming from the “unit-for-
unit [m]erger.” Thus, the court entered judgement in favor of Regency and 
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against Dieckman on counts I and II of the Amended Complaint. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state (or federal) court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 Other 
Red Rock Granite, Inc. v. Kafka Properties, LLC, No. 2019AP1633, 
2021 WL 446132 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2021).  
Granite Company-1 sued Granite Company-2 over breach of restrictive 
covenant. Granite Company1 claimed Granite Company2’s construction of 
a mineral fabrication facility and storage of finished products violated a 
restrictive covenant not to conduct mining, excavation, or sell minerals 
underlying Property. Granite Company-2 moved for summary judgment 
with support of an affidavit denying its violation of the restrictive covenant. 
In opposition, Granite Company-1 submitted affidavits claiming the 
covenant (1) bars adverse impact on Granite Company-1, (2) Granite 
Company-2’s actions upon Property constitute mining and (3) Granite 
Company-2’s storage of finished product on Property resembled 
advertisement for sale. The court rejected Granite Company-1’s assertions. 
The lower court determined that Granite Company-2’s actions, including 
storage, did not resemble sale, as enumerated within the restrictive 
covenant. Additionally, the lower court rejected Granite Company-1’s 
interpretation of adverse impact, holding that their interpretation was overly 
broad. Granite Company-1 appealed.  
On appeal, Granite Company-1 argued that Granite Company-2’s actions 
adversely impacted Granite Company-1’s economic interest, and Granite 
Company-2’s construction on Property constituted removal and sale of 
underlying minerals. Conversely, Granite Company-2 argued its facility 
construction did not violate the restrictive covenant, as the restrictive 
covenant merely restricted quarrying. The court affirmed, finding that 
Granite Company-1 failed to provide adequate evidentiary basis warranting 
discovery.  
In re Southland Royalty Co. LLC, 624 B.R. 331 (Bankr. D. Del. 2021). 
Oil field service provider (Service Provider) constructed wells for an 
upstream energy company (Energy Company). At a later date, Energy 
Company filed for bankruptcy. Service Provider then recorded a lien 
encumbering some of Energy Company’s wells. Service Provider 
proceeded to send a purchaser of Energy Company’s oil and gas 
(Purchaser) notice informing it of the lien; however, Service Provider did 
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not obtain relief from the automatic stay that resulted from the bankruptcy 
proceeding before filing the lien or before sending notice to Purchaser. 
Service Provider filed a petition with this court to maintain, continue, or 
perfect the lien, claiming an interest in Energy Company’s oil and gas 
production (Production), and sent notice to and Energy Company. Prior to 
Service Provider filing the petition, Energy Company entered into credit 
agreements with various lenders. The issues presented in this suit were: (1) 
whether Service Provider’s interest extended to Production; and (2) whether 
the Lien took priority over Energy Company’s subsequent credit 
agreements. Usually, a creditor’s interest in debtor’s property relates back 
to when the interest was created; however, the relation back exception does 
not apply to liens on Production. Production, in this case, could not be 
encumbered until notice was provided to both Purchaser and Energy 
Company; however, Service Provider did not give notice to Energy 
Company until after it filed this petition and after an imposition of an 
automatic stay. Therefore, because a lien on Production does not relate back 
to a time before the filing of a petition and because it violated the automatic 
stay, Service Provider’s interest in Production is void. Because the court 




Sw. Org. Project v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air, 2021 WL 965478 (D.N.M. 
March 15, 2021).  
Plaintiffs along with other entities filed for injunctive relief to “abate and 
mitigate endangerment” under the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act against the Defendant, a United States agency. The defendants 
allegedly have operated a fueling facility which has continued to store fuels 
of different kinds at the Kirtland Air Force Base. There was discovery of a 
fuel leak contamination in November 1999, which led the NM Environment 
Department to further investigate. The investigation found that the leak has 
“created a plume of contaminated soil and groundwater extending…off the 
Kirtland Air Force Base property beneath a residential neighborhood.” 
Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against the defendant for the present and 
past handling of the fuel leak.  
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss stating that the court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Further, the defendants argue 
that pursuant to the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, the court should defer to 
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the NM Environment Department’s Expertise in regulating the defendant’s 
actions. The court granted the defendants motion on the grounds that it did 
not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim under the 
RCRA. The court relied on the following two findings, the plaintiffs did not 
advance their claim properly under the RCRA, and the action of exercising 
jurisdiction would “severely undermine the RCRA’s limited judicial review 
provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b).” The court further found that the 
appropriate measure would be to defer to the NM Environment Department 
pursuant to the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine. The court found that the 
issues presented were outside the realm of the judge’s experience, which 
would result in an undue delay and burden on both parties. Additionally, 
that the regulatory action would be best served by the NM Environment 
Department which includes their scientific and technical experience. The 
defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.  
WildEarth Guardians v. Wehner, No. 17-cv-00891-RM, 2021 WL 
915931 (D. Colo. Mar. 10, 2021) 
Petitioners WildEarth Guardians and the Center for Biological Diversity 
(collectively “WildEarth”) brought this action under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”) seeking a declaration that Wildlife Services and 
relevant federal departments, have violated the National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”). 
The court review was highly deferential to the agency, in this case, 
Wildlife Services’ Colorado branch (“WS-Colorado”), unless the agency 
decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.” 
WildEarth claimed that WS-Colorado did not take a “hard look” at the 
environmental impacts of the predator damage management (“PDM”). 
Because NEPA only imposes procedural instead of substantive 
requirements on an agency action, the court found that WS-Colorado 
followed the procedure prescribed under NEPA regarding lethal PDM 
activities. Furthermore, the environmental assessment (“EA”), issued by 
WS-Colorado, explicitly considered the impacts of oil and gas development 
on animal habitats. WS-Colorado also has sufficiently reviewed factors 
contributing to increased black bear and human conflicts under NEPA, and 
relied on a scientific study regarding coyote density in Colorado. Therefore 
WS-Colorado had a rational basis and considered relevant factors 
sufficiently in reaching its determination, thus satisfied NEPA’s “hard 
look” requirement. 
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WildEarth also claimed that WS-Colorado was required but failed to 
prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”). The court determined 
whether EIS is necessary based on whether the agency had a rational basis 
in analyzing environmental effects and took into consideration the relevant 
factors. WildEarth failed to show an EIS was required on either of 
following five factors: (1) cumulative impact on target predator 
populations, (2) human health and safety, (3) ecologically critical areas, (4) 
highly controversial and uncertain risks, (5) endanger protected species. 
Therefore, the court found WS-Colorado’s evaluation of the significance 
factors was not arbitrary or capricious, and denied WildEarth’ petition for 
review. 
Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Forestry Service, 2021 
WL 855938 (S.D. Ohio March 8, 2021). 
This is a sequel case to a previous decision that found the Forestry 
Service had failed to take a “hard look” at the impact of fracking in the 
Wayne National Forest prior to granting leases. The parties were to brief on 
the availability of remedies besides complete vacatur or remand, and they 
came back with conflicting views on whether to apply the Allied-Signal 
Test advanced by the Service, while Organizations claimed agency actions 
that violated the National Environmental Policy Act must be vacated. 
Allied-Signal stated that a two-factor balancing test that looks at the 
seriousness of deficiencies and disruptive consequences of an interim 
change that may itself be changed to determine if vacatur is appropriate. 
Ordinarily, Organizations are right. However, this court agreed with 
Service, and chose to adopt Allied-Signal like so many other courts had 
already done. Under Allied Signal, courts have found defendants/parties 
opposing vacatur bear the burden to show that compelling equities demand 
anything less than vacatur. In addressing the first part of Allied-Signal, the 
court agreed with Organizations that seriousness of defect should be 
measured by the effect the error had in contravening the relevant statute, 
and that Organizations concern that keeping the leases and only requiring 
the hard look be done risks the Service not properly conducting the review 
was valid, but still found for Service as a serious possibility the agency 
could substantiate its decision existed. Service also stated that there would 
be serious economic disruptions if the leases were vacated due to revealed 
bidding strategies and wasted funds in oil exploration by bidders, which the 
court found outweighed the Organizations concerns on pure economic 
harms being insufficient to deny vacatur. 
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N. Cascades Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., No. 
220CV01321RAJBAT, 2021 WL 871421 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2021). 
Conservations challenged a tree thinning and construction Project, 
alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act and National 
Forest Management Acts. This opinion addresses two Contractors’ motion 
to intervene as defendants. The Project requires 3,000 to 4,000 acres of 
thinning and about thirty miles of road construction. The Project has three 
contracts to take care of this work. Both Contractors each have one of these 
contracts. The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington granted Contractors’ motion to intervene for the following 
reasons: Contractors’ motion was timely, their contracts were significant 
protectable interests, Contractors’ only way to protect those interests would 
be by actively participating, and Contractors were not adequately 
represented by existing parties. The contracts were protectable interests (1) 
because of their contractual nature; (2) because as users of public timber, 
they had a broad interest in any lawsuit that could hurt their ability to obtain 
timber; and (3) because they had interests in forest health and community 
resilience that are cognizable under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  
United States v. Acquest Transit LLC, No. 09-CV-55S, 2021 WL 809984 
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2021). 
In 2009, the Government filed suit against Contractor for violating the 
Clean Water Act (“CWA”) by disposing of fill from Contractor’s property 
into waters of the United States. The United States District Court for the 
Western District of New York issued a preliminary injunction against 
Contractor because it found they were dumping into water that was 
connected to “waters of the United States” by man-made ditches. At the 
time, man-made ditches were allowed to connect water to “waters of the 
United States” for purposes of jurisdiction under CWA. Before the court is 
an issue arising from a recent change in the definition of “waters of the 
United States.” The Navigable Waters Protection Rule (“NWPR”) 
(effective June 22, 2020) does not allow man-made ditches to connect 
bodies of water to satisfy the definition of “waters of the United States.” 
Contractor moved to dismiss counts one and three of the amended 
complaint because Contractor believed the NWPR applied retroactively to 
this case, therefore the water in question would be excluded from CWA 
jurisdiction since it was connected by man-made ditches. Government 
argued that the NWPR only applied prospectively and did not affect this 
case. The court agreed, finding that the NWPR cannot be applied 
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retroactively because it created new regulation rather than clarified existing 
law. Therefore, the Government’s claims did not automatically lack 
jurisdiction. The court denied Contractor’s motion to dismiss because 
findings of fact need to be made to determine the navigability of the water 
in question for purposes of CWA jurisdiction. The court also ordered the 
trial to be bifurcated with a jury trial to determine whether Contractor is 
liable under CWA, and if so, a bench hearing will determine the 
punishment.  
Taylor Energy Co. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 990 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
2021) 
After Hurricane Ivan irreparably damaged Lessee’s offshore oil well 
operations, Lessee entered into statutorily required decommissioning 
operations, placing funding into trusts for the Department of the Interior 
(“DOI”) to disburse. The agreements required Lessee to seek insurance 
reimbursements, which would offset Lessee’s required deposits, but also 
stated Lessee could not receive funding disbursements for such amounts as 
reimbursed by insurance. Lessee proposed to DOI a full and final deposit 
into the trust account, without any deposit offsets, but that Lessee would 
then keep all insurance proceeds and reimbursements received for work 
performed. DOI rejected the proposition because Lessee “(1) must make the 
full deposit due because [Lessee] had ‘not yet completed any phased of the 
[work]; and (2) must reimburse the trust account for any disbursements 
[Lessee] received that duplicated reimbursement from [Lessee’s] insurance 
company. The DOI also rejected another request for some delay in labor 
costs. Lessee appealed both decisions to the Interior Board of Land Appeals 
(IBLA), which affirmed in favor of DOI. In the District Court, Lessee 
sought judicial reversal of IBLA’s decisions as “arbitrary, capricious, 
contrary to law and an abuse of discretion,” and sought breach of contract 
relief in a related suit in the Claims Court on the same facts. The Claims 
Court dismissed its case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but Lessee 
then moved to transfer the district court action to the Claims Court and the 
district court granted the motion. DOI appealed the transfer order. The 
appeals court determined that under the Administrative Procedure Act, the 
IBLA decision is binding on the claims court, that claims court could not 
provide an adequate remedy, and Lessee may only seek judicial review of 
ILBA decisions in district court in order to recover any money damages. 
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S.G. v. City of Los Angeles, No. LA CIV17-09003, 2021 WL 911254 
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2021). 
Students sued City of Los Angeles and city developers (“City”) seeking 
declaratory relief; statutory relief, and injunctive relief requiring City to 
consider needs of people with disabilities affected by development projects 
and prohibiting City from continuing to engage in the practices complained 
of, and seeking punitive damages. City planned and approved a 
construction project that was immediately adjacent to the school Students 
attend, which is a participant school in the Deaf and Hard of Hearing 
(“DHH”) program. Students alleged violations of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et. seq., the Rehabilitation 
Act (“Section 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 794; violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; violation of the First 
Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; violation of the Unruh Act, Cal. 
Civ. Code §§ 51–53; violations of the California Constitution, art. I, §§ 2 
and 7; negligence under Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1714 and 3333, and Cal. 
Government Code § 815.2; and violation of mandatory duties. The court 
dismissed or denied all claims. The court applied narrow interpretation of 
licensing and permitting regulations. It applied forum analysis to dismiss 
the First Amendment claim but also noted the issue was dismissed without 
prejudice to the extent of a qualified immunity issued on factual record. The 
court applied due process and municipal liability to the Fourteenth 
Amendment claims, dismissing them lacking the necessary substantive 
predicates or mandatory language. The court dismissed the state law claims 
due to lack of any allegations that were not conclusory in nature, and no 
substantive allegations showing breach of mandatory duty. The court did 
leave open for Students’ revision of their claim on the single issue of City’s 
claim of immunity. This case has since been appealed, but there is no 
decision from the higher court as of publication. 
Sierra Club v. Dep’t of the Interior, 990 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2021). 
A wildlife advocacy organization (“Organization”) challenged a 
Department of the Interior Fish & Wildlife Service (“DOI”) biological 
opinion and incidental take statement authorizing “harm or harassment” of 
one ocelot in connection with a natural gas pipeline project. The issue 
before the court was whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious, and 
whether the DOI complied with the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 
U.S.C. § 1531, in its authorization decision determining the project was 
unlikely to jeopardize the cat’s life. Per the ESA, an incidental take 
statement, specifying the extent of impact, is required when the agency 
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determines the action will not endanger the life of the animal but will result 
in harm or harassment. Incidental takes are permissible if conditions are 
reasonable and prudent measures designed to minimize the extent of the 
take. The court reviewed the incidental take statement under the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s narrow and highly deferential standard to 
determine whether it is arbitrary, capricious, an abused of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law. The court held the take statement 
was not arbitrary or capricious because it clearly specified the anticipated 
take of the cat, set a clear and enforceable re-initiation trigger, and provided 
for action in the event of the cat’s death. The court also rejected 
Organization’s challenge of the DOI’s finding of no jeopardy to the cat’s 
life, finding DOI appropriately came to this conclusion after its formal 
consultation process and evaluations of the direct and indirect impacts of 
the action on the cats against the applicable environmental baseline. The 
court noted that the DOI took all required actions and made all required 
considerations such that its decision could not reasonably be classified as 
arbitrary and capricious, particularly under the highly deferential legal 
standard of review. 
Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 840 Fed.Appx. 188 (9th 
Cir. 2021).  
Company seeks review of an EPA decision granting an application for 
“small refinery exemption” under the Renewable Fuel Standard program. 
EPA contends that the matter should be remanded because EPA failed to 
provide an explanation for its remedy decision. Therefore, the court orders 
EPA to determine an appropriate remedy for Kern within 90 days of this 
order. Further, the court denies Kern’s request for an order for the EPA to 
provide a specific remedy. 
U.S. v. Dico, Inc., 4:10-cv-00503, 2021 WL 351993 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 1, 
2021). 
This Motion to Enter Consent Decree originates out of two major 
judgements against Original Owner and Subsequent Purchaser of a property 
which is now an EPA superfund site. In 1974, the EPA found TCE in the 
Des Moines water supply and traced it back to Owner’s property. EPA, via 
CERCLA, created a superfund site which is nowhere near completion at 
present date. A judgement was set against them including a multi-million-
dollar judgement. In 1994, PCB’s were discovered in Owner’s buildings 
and the EPA ordered repair, capsulation, and maintenance of the buildings 
to prevent further leaks. Purchaser later sold the building materials to a 
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Third Party which demolished and repurposed some of the condemned 
material. The EPA discovered this grievance a year later and moved for 
another judgement which was filed in 2010 and finalized in 2017. At the 
time of this case Purchaser had made no attempt to settle either judgment 
fine. In September 2020, the EPA lodged a proposed Consent Decree with 
the court to settle all outstanding claims and fines as one with additional 
procedural compliance. The court affirmed the order based on a four-part 
approval test. (1) Procedural Fairness – The court found no issues in the 
negotiation process. (2) Substantive Fairness – The court found that since 
the fines/procedures had been settled once before there was no issue here. 
(3) – Reasonableness – The court initially showed skepticism of the 
settlement but after weighing the costs against the interest of the public and 
finally settling the case they approved it. (4) – Consistency with CERCLA 
– The court found no issues in this area. The court found this settlement as 
“fair, adequate, and reasonable” while protecting the public interest. The 
order was approved.  
Backes v. Bernhardt, No. 1:19-CV-00482-CL, 2020 WL 906313 (D. Or. 
Feb. 24, 2020). 
 Mine Operators brought a cause of action challenging the final decision 
by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) and the Internal Board of 
Land Appeals (“IBLA”). The Mine Operators received two Noncompliance 
Notices from BLM claiming they violated BLM regulations regarding 
mining operation and occupancy of public land, seemingly signed by a “Jim 
Bell.” Mine Operators submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to 
determine the identity of the person, Jim Bell, who acted on behalf of BLM, 
alleging no one associated with the name “Jim Bell” worked at the local 
BLM offices where the notices originated from. Mine Operators did not 
raise the issue of the signature on the Noncompliance Notices during 
administrative proceedings. Discovery is typically not permitted in APA 
judicial proceedings; however, there are four exceptions. Mine Operators 
claimed the second exception – “necessary to determine whether the agency 
has relied on documents not in the record” – and the fourth exception – “a 
plaintiff makes a showing of agency bad faith” – applied in their situation. 
The court found that the signature was not a factor in IBLA’s decision, 
therefore IBLA did not rely on documents not in the record to make its 
decision. The court also found no evidence of bad faith because BLM 
provided good reason for not disclosing the identity of the signer. Mine 
Operators claim BLM failed to properly delegate the authority to sign the 
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Noncompliance Notice. There is no statute that creates a duty to delegate 
the signatory authority and therefore there is no legal basis for the claim. 
State 
Dorrell v. Woodruff Energy, Inc, 2021 WL 922446 (N.J. Super. App. 
Div. March 11, 2021). 
Individual owned a store and while preparing to sell the property, 
discovered it had been contaminated with petroleum products, with 
kerosene or fuel oil being undisputed as contaminants. Under the New 
Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act), plaintiff claimed 
that Company 1 and Company 2 were persons “in any way responsible for 
the hazardous substances found” and therefore liable. Company 1 did 
deliver fuel oil to a one thousand gallon above ground storage tank (AST) 
in the store’s dirt floor basement and a leak from this tank is undisputed, 
Company 2 is alleged to have delivered gasoline to three underground 
storage tanks (UST) that were later removed or abandoned. The disputed 
facts came from Individuals expert witness with a degree in earth science 
that had done site remediation work in the past. The trial court certified him 
as an expert in investigating subsurface conditions, but not to identify 
specific contaminants. The trial court later appeared to reopen the question 
on whether the expert could identify contaminants but never resolved that 
question. The trial court found that no evidence necessarily linked 
Company 1 with the leak in the basement and Company 2 had more likely 
than not delivered gasoline to the other three tanks, relying on plaintiff’s 
expert testimony as no other defense experts found gasoline on the site. 
Individual appealed, and lost, claiming that trial court applied to high a 
burden on her claims against Company 1. Appeals court said that the trial 
had quoted the controlling case and applied the correct standard. Company 
2 also appealed, and won a remand, on the qualifications of the plaintiff’s 
expert as the plaintiff had never properly established their expert’s 
qualifications as required.  
State by Smart Growth Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, 954 N.W.2d 
584 (Minn. 2021).  
Interest Groups filed petition alleging that City’s “scheduled approval of 
comprehensive plan violated Minnesota Environmental Plan Act (MERA).” 
The District Court granted City’s motion to dismiss and Interest Groups 
appeal. The Court reverses the District Court’s holding and finds that City’s 
comprehensive plan under Metropolitan Land Planning Act (MEPA) 
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violates the MERA because it will likely cause materially adverse 
environmental results. The MERA was enacted to “provide every person 
‘with an adequate civil remedy to protect air, water, land and other natural 
resources … from pollution, impairment, or destruction.’” (internal citation 
omitted). To Court clarifies that “pollution, impairment, or destruction” is 
defined as any action “by any person … which materially adversely effects 
or is likely to materially adversely affect the environment.” Following the 
enactment of the MERA, the legislature passed three additional 
environmental acts “ ‘to complement the MERA,’ one of which was the 
MEPA.” The MEPA was passed with the purpose of requiring entities to 
prepare an impact statement when “there is potential for significant 
environmental effects.” The issue before the Court is whether the 
exemption of comprehensive plans under MEPA means that comprehensive 
plans are exempt from actions brought under the MERA. The Court notes 
that this is a question of statutory interpretation. Precedent leads the Court 
to determine that MERA will not be applied broadly absent “express 
statutory language form to that effect” and there is no express language 
exempting MEPA from review under MERA. Therefore, MEPA does not 
prevent comprehensive plans from being reviewed under MERA. The Court 
also considered whether Interest Group’s petition “sets forth a legally 
sufficient claim for relief.” Because the facts in the petition, if true, provide 
grounds for relief, the District Court erred in dismissing Interest Group’s 
petition.  
State v. Bedford LLC, 137 N.Y.S. 3d 248 (Misc. 2020).  
This order arises out of a continuous litigation between State and 
Property Owner regarding the cleanup of a “Brownfield” site. The Owner 
had no reason to believe that contaminates had passed through and/or were 
dumped on the property and that it had contributed to the plume in the area. 
However, State informed them of differing findings and that there was a 
high chance of it. Owner had the choice of investigating themselves or 
reimbursing State following the State’s investigation. The owners 
eventually chose to join the cleanup program as a volunteer and not 
participant. The important distinction being that Volunteers are not liable 
for offsite contamination and/or cleanup while participants are. The State 
subsequently accepted the application but made Owner a participant, 
against their applications intentions. Litigation continued regarding this and 
other issues, mostly pertaining to access to the property for testing by State 
and the classification of Owner. Under the agreement the State has the 
ability to investigate and monitor Brownfield sites as needed and can 
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upgrade the site to a State Superfund site, however, Owner disagrees since 
they contend they did not agree to these terms and is outside the State’s 
powers through various statutes. The parties had differing expert opinions 
on the flow origin; however, the court focuses on the undisputed fact that 
there are high levels of contaminants. The court holds that no evidentiary 
trial is needed since by allowing access the State could resolve most issues. 
The Owner is ordered to allow and facilitate the access and testing by the 
State to further determine issues. This is granted because the State does 
have statutory power to do so and they did not have to prove that it was 
contaminated since that was undisputed.  
Tenn. Dep’t Of Env’t and Conservation v. Roberts, No. M2020-00388-
COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 388611 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2021). 
Original case concerned the Department putting in an order for fund 
recovery from Property Owners. Owners had uncovered rusted-out oil tanks 
when renovating the property and smelled petroleum. Department cleaned 
up and destroyed contaminants and filed for fund recovery. The original 
administration judge found that Owners were “responsible parties” and the 
release “occurred” upon discovery. Tanks had been covered and abandoned 
prior the Owners’ purchase of the property. Owners appealed to the Board 
and an administrative judge ordered differing interpretations and reversed. 
Department appealed to the trial court which then reversed the second judge 
by finding an abuse of discretion and scope. Question on appeal on what the 
judge “when sitting with the board” can decide and/or advise the full board 
on. Board has full power to change initial orders dependent on the proper 
application of the legal framework. A judge who is sitting with the board 
can interpret or decide procedural questions of law. However, broad 
deference must be given to the initial judge regarding evidence since they 
act like that of “a trial judge in a civil action.” Therefore, the Board is only 
able to rule on the record and not decide evidentiary standards. Sitting 
board judges are allowed to decide procedural questions only not decide the 
substantive legal issues brought up. Darnell was found to have overstepped 
his power and scope by deciding new interpretations of “occurrence” and 
“responsible party”. He also erred in barring the Department from arguing 
alternative theories. The sitting judge does have the absolute ability to 
inform the board of their theory or alternative theories but may not decide 
the issues for the board itself. Decision was affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and remanded for further proceedings.  
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Beer v. New York State Dep’t. of Envtl. Conservation, 189 A.D.3d 1916 
(2020). 
Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) issued a water 
withdrawal permit to Town of New Paltz (“Town”) to develop new water 
well with the Village of New Paltz (“Village”). The purpose of the project 
was to supply another water source to Catskill Aqueduct customers during 
planned outages. Beer, representing property owners in the area, sought to 
cancel the permit issued by DEC for the new well on both procedural and 
substantive grounds.  
Procedurally, Beer claimed DEC altered the proposed plan after the 
required 15-day public comment period by imposing new conditions on 
development. Substantively, Beer claimed the proposal did not satisfy the 
statutory requirements under ECL 15-1503(2) and failed to consider the 
well’s proximity to a nearby sand and gravel mine.  
DEC asserted that Beer was collaterally estopped from bringing the 
claims and that the claims were time barred. New York’s Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, agreed with DEC on both the procedural and 
substantive claims. The standard of review for administrative decisions is a 
lack of rational basis or whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious.  
The court held that the conditions imposed after the public comment 
period were not substantial and did not constitute a modification. Beer 
failed to show that DEC lacked a rational basis for the conditions. On the 
substantive claims, the court held that Beer’s challenge was properly 
dismissed as untimely and barred by collateral estoppel because of the four-
month statute of limitations. Additionally, the court held that the mining 
activity was above the water table and no rational basis existed to modify 
the mining permits because of the new water permit. 
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